Nineteen thirty-three was a year marked by profound shifts and stark contrasts across the globe, from the ambitious, yet ill-fated, attempts at international economic cooperation to the chilling realities of mass starvation under totalitarian regimes, and the initial, experimental thrust of a new American administration. It was a period where established norms were challenged, and the very fabric of societies seemed to hang in the balance, a truth we must confront directly and honestly, as the sources reveal.
In the nascent days of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency in the United States, a strong emphasis was placed on fiscal conservatism. Lewis W. Douglas, serving as Roosevelt’s head of the Bureau of the Budget, was a key figure in this drive. He exerted significant influence, successfully persuading President Roosevelt to implement severe cuts in proposed appropriations for executive agencies. Douglas was known for his “old-fashioned pro-balance budget views,” a stance he continued to hold firmly even into early 1934, much to the frustration of other administration figures like Marriner Eccles. This early move by Roosevelt aligned with his initial commitment to reduce government expenditures and balance the budget, reflecting a prevailing conventional economic wisdom of the time.
Globally, a monumental effort to stabilize the fractured world economy culminated in the World Monetary & Economic Conference in London, which convened in mid-June 1933. Representatives from sixty-six of the sixty-seven officially recognized nations descended upon the city, gathering in the Hall of Fossils of the new Geological Museum. British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, a principal organizer, envisioned this assembly as a crucial step towards restoring economic confidence through coordinated actions on debt, currencies, monetary policies, and trade. King George V himself welcomed the delegates, impressing non-Anglophones by fluidly switching between French and English. The agenda was exceptionally ambitious, aiming for agreements on lowering trade barriers, disarmament, resolving war debts and reparations, returning major trading countries to the gold standard, and establishing a common approach to reflation and deflation. However, the conference proved to be a resounding failure, contributing “dismally” to the breakdown of the international economy. The American Congress stubbornly refused to budge on war debts and reparations, and Great Britain remained committed to its trade protections. In a move that stunned attendees, President Roosevelt scuttled the entire plan, ultimately rejecting any notion of currency stabilization. He famously denounced it as a “specious fallacy” and railed against the “old fetishes of so-called international bankers,” a bitter reference potentially fueled by his suspicion of a plot by figures like J.P. Morgan partner Thomas W. Lamont to influence his advisors towards stabilization. Roosevelt’s decisive stance effectively committed the U.S. to a program of fiat paper money and steep price “reflation,” thereby ushering in an era of monetary nationalism, currency blocks, and economic warfare that would define the remainder of the 1930s. Key American economic advisors, including James P. Warburg, Oliver Sprague, and Raymond Moley, who had supported the stabilization efforts, subsequently resigned or were ousted from the administration.
Domestically, the Roosevelt administration was rapidly implementing its New Deal programs. By October 1933, the National Recovery Administration (NRA) had become a prominent force. Its symbol, the Blue Eagle, and motto, “We Do Our Part,” were indeed highly visible across the nation. The NRA was a major new policy experiment, designed to regulate industries by raising wages, limiting working hours, improving labor conditions, and permitting collective bargaining. Roosevelt approved industry codes at an astonishing pace, signing several per week by September and accelerating to two per day by the end of the year. This widespread adoption, while seemingly effective, was paradoxically seen by some observers as an indication of underlying weakness in the administration’s approach. The NRA even “spawned songs,” further cementing its presence in public consciousness. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce lauded the NRA as a “Magna Carta of industry and labor,” and industry leaders, like Henry I. Harriman, openly stated that the free market needed to be replaced by a “philosophy of planned national economy”.
When considering economic philosophy, Justice Louis Brandeis was known for his advocacy of a “small-scale, competitive economy,” a perspective that sometimes put him at odds with certain aspects of the New Deal. His views consistently demonstrated a belief that “bigness” could indeed be problematic. This contrasted sharply with some of Roosevelt’s “brain trusters” who admired the technological efficiency of large corporations and accepted economic concentration as an inevitable development.
Tragically, 1933 also bore witness to immense human suffering in the Soviet Union. Millions of citizens, particularly in Ukraine, died from starvation. This horrific famine was a direct consequence of the domestic policies implemented as part of Stalin’s Five-Year Plan, specifically aimed at “overcom[ing] the resistance of enemies” to its directives. The Ukrainian party leadership had requested seed grain in March 1932, but it was already too late to prevent a poor harvest, leading to widespread desperation where peasants wrote letters pleading for “bread!”. In November 1932, peasants in Ukraine were forced to return grain advances, and party brigades and state police were unleashed to hunt for any available food. By early 1933, as starvation intensified, Stalin sealed the borders of the Ukrainian republic and closed off cities to prevent peasants from fleeing or begging. Internal passports, introduced on January 14, 1933, legally restricted peasants from residing in cities. The collectivization policies not only led to physical destruction but also morally eroded the Ukrainian peasantry, driving them to strip ornaments from country churches before succumbing to hunger. Despite the widespread mortality, officially, the famine was ignored; Stalin made no mention of it at the “Congress of Victors” in early 1934. The Soviet authorities actively denied the famine, rebuffing appeals for food aid and labeling accurate reports as “big scare stor[ies]”. This period stands as a stark testament to the human cost of totalitarian policies, a “most unforgettable experience of the Soviet peoples”.
Thus, 1933 emerges from the historical record as a year of immense complexity and profound consequences, laying down pathways and reinforcing trends that would shape the remainder of the decade and beyond.